Hohfeld's Arc by Andrews, Mark
 1 
Hohfeld's Arc 
Mark Andrews 
 
In 1913 Yale Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld published his 
article, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Legal Reasoning.”1 In this examination of basic legal 
relations, Hohfeld found the earth, air, fire and water of 
the law. He looked for the relationships that become the 
source of all others. He found a total of eight and 
identified two pairs of four within the eight. 
This essay argues that the eight jural relations form 
a single structure; they are the expression of a bell 
curve, a range of opportunity and risk that extends from 
the near certainty that an event will occur to the near 
certainty that it will not. 
This article, then, is about Hohfeld’s Arc. 
 
Identification and Organization of the Eight Relations 
American law has hundreds of labels for legal 
relationships; each label is a shorthand term for some 
ratio of opportunity to risk. Hohfeld’s arc makes sense of 
this larger and complex group.2 
A. The Arc 
Hohfeld wrote that the eight relations are the "lowest 
common denominators of the law".3 Yale Professor Arthur 
                     
1 23 Yale L.J. 16 (1913)(hereinafter, “Fundamental Legal 
Conceptions”). 
2 The author has previously argued that the eight relations 
form a single unit. Mark Andrews, “Hohfeld’s Cube,” 16 
Akron L.Rev. 471 (1983). 
3 Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra n. 1, at 58. Hohfeld 
called the relations "the lowest generic conceptions to 
which any and all 'legal quantities' may be reduced." Id. 
at 59. 
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Corbin, one of the earliest defenders of Hohfeld's work, 
called these relations “constant elements, into which all 
of our variable combinations can be analyzed…”4  
Hohfeld defined none of his new terms; he provided 
examples from case law. Corbin designed the formal 
definitions for Hohfeld's concepts. 
Hohfeld divided the eight relations into two pairs: 
those which must always appear together and those which 
which can never appear together. 
Those relations which must appear together are the 
correlatives. The content of Hohfeld’s Arc will be shown by 
examining the correlatives and placing them on a normal 
curve.5 
 
 
                     
4 Corbin, Jural Relations and Their Classification, 30 Yale 
L.J. 226, 229 (1921) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter, 
“Jural Relations”]. 
5 This essay argues that the eight legal relations 
correspond to the areas on a normal curve. Hohfeld’s Arc is 
a statistical bell curve. This observation rests on a 
comparison between the characteristics of a bell curve and 
those of each of the jural relations. However, the final 
proof of this observation will require a mathematical 
analysis which is not offered here. 
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1. Certainty that an event will occur  
The legal spectrum begins at theoretical certainty. At 
the two ends of a bell curve, the probability that an event 
will occur never reaches exactly one or exactly zero. The 
probability approaches, but never reaches, these limits. 
Here, “certainty” means that the likelihood of success so 
approaches theoretical certainty that a human decision may 
be safely made. 
Rights and duties are the legal relations most 
familiar to most people. They are the legal statuses where 
it is most likely that an event will occur. 
Right. "An enforceable claim to performance (action or 
forbearance) by another. [Right] is the legal relation of A 
to B when society commands action or forbearance by B."6 
Duty. "[Duty] is the legal relation of a person, B, 
who is commanded by society to act or to forbear for the 
benefit of another person, A, either immediately or in the 
future, and who will be penalized by society for 
disobedience.”7 
This area fills the right end of the curve. Note that 
the ratio of opportunity to risk is not constant. Rather, 
the Right/Duty area begins where the probability is good, 
but not overwhelming, that an event will occur; but as the 
curve extends outward indefinitely, the statistical 
correlation between what the rights holder wants and what 
will actually occur as the outcome approaches positive 1. 
This fluidity in the likelihood of success reflects 
the real decisions that people make. A change in risk 
appears as an adjustment in interest rates, for example. 
                     
6 Corbin, “Legal Analysis and Terminology,” 29 Yale L.J. 
163, 167 (1919) (paraphrase)[hereinafter, “Legal Analysis”. 
7 Id. 
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The lender might see an opportunity in loaning money to two 
applicants, but still adjusts the interest rate to account 
for differences in two credit histories. 
 
2. Potential of an event occurring 
Closer to the middle of the spectrum, there is no 
event happening in the present. But the potential exists. 
Power. "The legal relation of A to B when A's own 
voluntary act will cause new legal relations either between 
B and A or between B and a third person."8 
Liability. "The relation of A to B when A may be 
brought into new legal relations by the voluntary act of 
B."9 
Powers and liabilities are often lumped together with 
rights and duties in everyday speech, but there is a 
difference. A power signals the absence of the certainty 
that accompanies a right. A right to performance exists 
now; a power to cause performance means that performance 
might or might not happen. 
This area begins at the top of the curve and moves 
toward the right. In this area, there is a lower 
probability that an event will occur. Some combination of 
factors cause the probability to fall to a point where it 
is imprudent or impossible to act to cause that event to 
happen. 
A common example of a power is a “call” in the stock 
market. A call is the power to buy a certain stock at a 
certain price, say, ten dollars. The person holding the 
call does not have to buy the stock when it reaches ten 
                     
8 Id. 
9 Id. at 169. 
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dollars or any other price. For reasons of his own, the 
holder might exercise the call when this stock is selling 
at nine or eleven dollars. The chances of this stock 
reaching a price of ten dollars are reflected in the price 
of the call. This price is a function of a comparison of 
the promises contained in the contract against the current 
news in the stock market and predictions for its future. 
Liabilities always accompany powers. For purposes of 
legal analysis, “liability” is a neutral term; it does not 
mean that the person under a liability has done anything 
wrong. In the example of stock market calls, the person who 
must sell her stock at ten dollars is under a liability.  
Take the example of an aging adult who cannot care for 
himself and is placed under the care of a relative. The 
relative, acting as conservator, holds a power for the 
benefit of the incapacitated adult to handle his legal 
matters, such as paying utility bills or selling the car; 
the incapacitated adult is under a liability because he can 
be brought into new legal relationships without his 
consent. 
 
3. Absence of both a legal duty and prohibition 
What happens when the outcome is not certainly yes or 
certainly no?  This pair of relations attracts less 
attention. This pair receives such little attention that 
there is no standard name for one of the relations; Hohfeld 
had to invent one. 
Privilege. "The legal relation of A to B when A … is 
free or at liberty to conduct himself in a certain manner 
for the benefit of B by the command of society; and when he 
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is not threatened with any penalty for disobedience…"10 
No-Right. "The legal relation of a person (A) in whose 
behalf society commands nothing of another (B)."11 
Now the outcome ranges from 50/50 to very unlikely. 
One person is owed nothing, and the other has no duty to 
act. However, both remain free to act, and that quality 
will become an important factor later when distinguishing 
Privilege/No-right from Disability/ Immunity. 
Privilege/No-right occupies the area from the top of 
the curve to the left. In this area, the probability falls 
below zero that an event might occur. 
In everyday speech, “Privilege” often means a status 
that grants special benefits. There no such sense here; 
some commentators have suggested “liberty” as a better 
term.12 
Although the Privilege/No-right relationship might 
seem odd or rare, it is actually quite common. A charity 
soliciting donations has a No-right in relation to the 
people being solicited, because potential donors have no 
legal duty to contribute. 
Typically, any two people chosen at random on the 
street will have almost no legal duties in relation to each 
other. The duties that might exist, for example, are a 
                     
10 Id. (emphasis in original). 
11 Id. at 168. There is no standard legal term for the 
relationship where one person is owed nothing from another. 
“No-right” describes the absence of a Right (so a Privilege 
would be a “No-duty”.) The Restatement of Property chose 
“an absence of right” to indicate the same idea. 
Restatement of Property at §2, comment. The author suggests 
the term “alligation” to indicate “absence of a bond”. 
12 Comment, “Hohfeldian Analysis of Selected Interests in 
Immovable under Louisiana Law,” 25 Loyola L.R. 283, 284, n. 
10 (1979), citing Williams, “The Concept of Legal Liberty,” 
56 Columbia L.Rev. 1129 (1956). 
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general duty not to physically interfere with each other. 
It is not obvious that this No-right status is a legal 
relationship. Nonetheless, one of the people in the pair 
enjoys protection from being forced to do anything despite 
urgent demands and pleas from the other side. In American 
law, a bystander who witnesses an accident is generally 
under no duty to help the victim. However harshly people 
might judge the bystander as an ethical matter, the victim 
cannot sue in court. The accident victim has a No-right in 
relation to the bystander. In this example, the bystander 
has a Privilege.13 
 
4. Certainty that an event will not occur 
Legal certainty returns with final pair of 
correlatives: Disability and Immunity. But now the 
certainty is that performance will not occur. 
Immunity. "The relation of A to B when B has no legal 
Power… to affect some one or more of the existing legal 
relations of A.”14 Person A has an Immunity against B’s 
wanting to change something about their legal status. 
Disability. "The relation of A to B when by no 
voluntary act of his own can A extinguish… the existing 
legal relations of B."15 
This area is on the left side of the normal curve. The 
statistical correlation between what one party wants and 
what that same party can do approaches -1. Because of some 
                     
13 Corbin: Person B has a Privilege when he is “at liberty 
to conduct himself for the benefit of B by the command of 
society, but he is not threatened with any penalty for 
disobedience.” Legal Analysis, supra n. 6, at 167 
(paraphrase). 
14 Id. at 170. 
15 Id. 
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combination of legal restrictions, at this end of the 
spectrum Person A is unable to demand performance.16 Person 
B is absolutely free from any such demand.17 
Legal disabilities are rarely given that particular 
name.18 However, they are very common when society wants to 
protect some interest that is easily damaged. Examples 
include people who are too likely to surrender their assets 
(minors cannot make a binding contract) or who are in a 
poor bargaining position (borrowers covered by usury laws). 
An Immunity always accompanies a Disability. Here, 
Person B is protected. “When Person A has no legal power to 
affect the existing legal relations of B, then Person B 
enjoys an immunity from A.”19 In many states, the rule used 
to be that an injured person could not sue a charity, such 
as a nonprofit hospital, and this protection was known as 
“charitable immunity.” 
                     
16 Corbin: Person A is under a legal Disability when A 
cannot modify the legal relations of Person B. Legal 
Analysis, supra n. 6, at 170. 
17 I believe, but I cannot prove, that the two points marked 
Power/Liability and Privilege/No-right are points of 
inflection on the arc. Such points are where the direction 
of a curve changes from curving upward to downward, or vice 
versa. On the normal curve, these points lie one standard 
deviation above and below the mean. 
Starting from the Right/Duty end of the arc, the curve 
trends upward until it reaches the point of inflection. 
This point marks the beginning of diminishing returns; the 
relationship then transforms into Power/Liability. 
From the top of the curve and moving toward 
Disability/Immunity, the corresponding inflection point is 
where restrictions on behavior so overwhelm the freedom to 
act that the relationship becomes Privilege/No-right. 
18 As in the case of “liability”, “disability” is a neutral 
term; it does not suggest that someone has done something 
wrong. 
19 Corbin, Legal Analysis, supra n. 6, at 170. 
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The United States government has sovereign immunity. 
No one can sue the federal government without its consent, 
and thus everyone in the world is under a disability from 
doing so. 
The arc of probabilities reflects the problems of 
daily decisionmaking. A given legal relationship might be 
correctly labeled, such as Right or Immunity; but there are 
only eight such labels. Each of the eight areas represents 
a range of probabilities, and someone’s decision of whether 
to act or not act requires an estimate of where on the 
normal curve the decision maker is sitting. 
 
B. The Cube 
Corbin was the first of several writers to notice the 
unity of Hohfeld's concepts. Corbin found that by starting 
from the terms "Duty" and "Power," one may arrive at the 
remaining six.20  Several similar analyses each found a part 
of a general truth about Hohfeld's work:21 each jural 
relation can be defined in terms of the others because all 
are part of a unified whole. 
As noted, Hohfeld found that the relations divided 
into two sets: those which must exist together, called 
correlatives22; and those which cannot exist together, 
                     
20 Jural Relations, n. 4, at 230.  
21 Goble, A Redefinition of Basic Legal Terms, 35 Colum. L. 
Rev. 535, 535 (1935). Morse, The Hohfeldian Place of Right 
in Constitutional Cases, 6 Cap. U. L. Rev. 1, 8 n.32 (1976) 
(citing G. Christie, Jurisprudence: Text and Readings on 
the Philosophy Of Law 818, n.83 (1973). See also Morse, The 
Hohfeldian Place of Power in Constitutional Cases, supra n. 
21, at 40 (relationship of "Privilege" and "Right"). Finan 
divided them into primary and secondary relations. 
Presumptions and Modal Logic: A Hohfeldian Approach, 13 
Akron L. Rev. 19, 26-31 (1979). 
22 Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra n. 1, at 30. 
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called opposites.23   Here are the two sets: 
Jural Correlatives 
Right; Duty 
Power; Liability 
No-right; Privilege 
Disability; Immunity 
Jural Opposites 
Right; Privilege 
Power; Immunity 
No-right; Duty 
Disability; Liability 
The eight terms also form two corresponding squares of 
opposition; these unite as a single Cube.24  
 
 
 
The construction of the Cube begins as follows. Right 
                     
23 Id. 
24 Using the correlatives and opposites as a starting point, 
several authors have arranged Hohfeld’s ideas into the 
traditional Square of Opposition. R.E. Robinson, S.C. 
Coval, J.C. Smith, The Logic of Rights, 33 U. Toronto L.J. 
267 (1983); Phillip Mullock, Holmes on Contractual Duty, 33 
U Pittsburgh L.R. 471, 473 (1972); Frederic Fitch, 9 
Logique et Analyse 269 (1967); Stephen Hudson and Douglas 
Husak, “Legal Rights: How Useful is Hohfeldian Analysis?” 
37 Philosophical Studies 45 (1980). 
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and Duty appear on two different squares, indicating 
correlatives. 
The next pair is Privilege/No-right. Privilege is the 
jural opposite of Duty. In relation to Duty, Privilege lies 
on a diagonal, to indicate that the two statements that are 
contradictory. "No-Right" is the correlative of a 
Privilege. No-right appears on the corresponding corner of 
the first square. 
The Cube begins to show one method of checking its 
validity; the placement of one jural relation results in an 
arrangement that is consistent with the position of 
another. Thus far, No-Right lies on a diagonal from Right. 
On a square of opposition, this position indicates that the 
two are contradictory. The two are indeed jural opposites.25 
That completes the list of correlatives. But the 
relation of the correlative relations to the opposites is 
less clear; the two pairs share no terms in common. 
Fortunately, Hohfeld observed some connections between 
them. 
1. Liability is related to Duty. 
Hohfeld writes succinctly, "It is a liability to have 
a duty created.”26 He cites case law to the effect that a 
present Duty implies the existence of a past Liability.27 
Liability is thus the corollary of Duty and falls below 
Duty on the same side of the Cube. 
Liability and Power now appear across from each other 
                     
25 Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 1, at 30. 
26 Id. at 53. 
27 Id. at 52. Similarly, a present Right implies the 
existence of a past Power that was exercised to create that 
right. See also Mullock, supra n. 24, at 478 (noting the 
same relationship between Power and Right and between 
Liability and Duty). 
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on opposite sides of the Cube. This relative position 
suggests that these concepts are correlatives; this is in 
fact the relation between these two. 
2. Power is related to Right. 
When discussing the notion of legal Power, Hohfeld 
cites court opinions that a Power accompanies a Right and 
that Right implies the existence of a Power. He cites case 
law to the effect that the notion of property involves both 
a right to possession and power of disposition.28 
The relation between Right and Power suggests that 
Power is the logical corollary of Right. Power thus appears 
below the term Right, where corollaries traditionally 
appear. 
3. Power is to Immunity as Right is to Privilege. 
Hohfeld identified a third set of jural relations, 
which might be called the jural analogs. The analogs are 
important here, for they show the substantive connection 
between the sets of jural correlatives and jural opposites. 
The analogy permits the location of the final concept, 
Immunity. Hohfeld writes: 
[A] power bears the same general contrast to an 
immunity that a right does to a privilege. A right is 
one's affirmative claim against another, and a 
privilege is one's freedom from the right or claim of 
another. Similarly, a power is one's affirmative 
"control" over a given legal relation as against 
another; whereas an immunity is one's freedom from the 
legal power or "control" of another as regards some 
legal relation.29  
                     
28 Id. at 45. 
29 Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 1, at 55. 
Hohfeld might have continued the analogy to cover the other 
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Applying the relationship of Right and Privilege, Immunity 
appears on the Cube above Privilege. This location suggests 
that Immunity and Disability are correlatives, and this is 
indeed the case. 
Thus, the jural analogs are: 
Power:Immunity   as  Right:Privilege. 
Liability:Disability as  Duty:No-Right. 
The analogs contain all eight jural relations and so bind 
together the two groups of Hohfeld's concepts. 
This, then, is Hohfeld's Cube in the form of its two 
squares of opposition: 
 
   
Some examples illustrate the validity of the two 
squares of opposition. The jural opposites appear 
diagonally as contradictories. The four relations where one 
implies another are shown on the sides. 
                                                             
four ideas: 
A Liability bears the same general contrast to a Disability 
as a Duty does to a No-Right. A Duty is one's affirmative 
obligation to another and one's No-Right is the absence of 
any obligation from another. Similarly, a Liability is 
one's affirmative subjection to the "control" of another in 
a given legal relation; whereas a Disability is the absence 
of any legal Power or "control" of another as regards some 
legal relation. 
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The square holds true for the contraries, which cannot 
be true at the same time, and the subcontraries, which 
cannot be false at the same time. One person cannot 
simultaneously have a Right to something and a Disability 
from ever asking for the same thing. These concepts cannot 
be true at the same time (although both can be false); 
accordingly, they appear as contraries. Disability and 
Immunity are similar; they cannot exist at the same time. 
A person can have a Privilege to do or not do 
something, and yet be under a Liability to do so in the 
future.  These two concepts can be true at the same time30; 
thus they appear as subcontraries. Power and No-right have 
a similar relation to each other; a person can have a No-
right to demand something from another, and yet hold a 
Power to do so in the future. 
 
C. The bell curve 
Hohfeld’s Arc is a normal curve. As such, it expresses 
the distribution of relations that would occur if human 
life were a coin toss. The law uses the bell curve to 
respond to human behavior and to protect or modify it as 
necessary. The law makes rules so as to skew the bell curve 
toward desired behavior. 
When human behavior, the facts of the case, is 
compared to the law, the process is usually seen as a 
straightforward syllogism: (1) A person who touches another 
without consent is guilty of assault; (2) Person A touched 
another Person B without B’s consent; therefore (3) Person 
                     
30 Although both relations cannot be false.  If both 
Privilege and Liability were false, that would mean that 
the same person had a Duty to do something and an Immunity 
from doing the same thing. 
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A is guilty of assault. 
The traditional square of opposition is indeed 
sufficient to resolve the issue when the facts are 
uncontested and the law is clear. Under such circumstances, 
it is easy to draw a conclusion with a series of simple if-
then statements. 
But often the relation of facts to the law is unclear. 
Two witnesses disagree, or an important term in a statute 
is left undefined. In such circumstances the theoretical 
certainty of a square of opposition does not exist. The 
resolution of the legal issue is then expressed in 
probabilities; thus the Arc becomes the useful tool for 
analysis. 
 
Closing 
Since the appearance of Fundamental Legal Conceptions 
in 1913, Hohfeld’s work has attracted both followers31 and 
critics;32 a justice of the United States Supreme Court has 
                     
31 E.g., Anderson, The Logic of Hohfeldian Propositions, 33 
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 29 (1971); Corbin, Jural Relations, supra 
n. 4; Corbin, Legal Analysis, supra n. 6; Cullison, A 
Review of Hohfeld's Fundamental Legal Concepts, 16 Cleve.-
Mar. L. Rev. 559 (1967); Goble, A Redefinition of Basic 
Legal Terms, supra n. 21; Morse, The Hohfeldian Place of 
Power in Constitutional Cases, supra n. 21; Morse, The 
Hohfeldian Approach to Constitutional Cases, 9 Akron L. 
Rev. 1 (1975); Mullock, Holmes on Contractual Duty, 33 U. 
Pitt. L. Rev. 471 (1972); Williams, The Concept of Legal 
Liberty, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 1129 (1956); Comment, Hohfeldian 
Analysis of Selected Interests in Immovables Under 
Louisiana Law, 25 Loy. L. Rev. 283 (1979). Hohfeld’s ideas 
became part of the Restatement of Property: Restatement 
(Second) of Property §§ 1-4 (1977). 
32 E.g., Husick, Hohfeld's Jurisprudence, 72 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
263 (1924); Kocourek, Basic Jural Relations, 17 Ill. L. 
Rev. 515 (1923); Kocourek, Tabulae Minores Jurisprudentiae, 
30 Yale L.J. 215 (1921); McMenamin, Book Review, 10 Vill. 
 16 
referred to these ideas.33  The eight relations divide and 
unite the legal world. They form a coherent structure that 
allows us to see each of the concepts in relation to all of 
the others. 
                                                             
L. Rev. 407 (1965); Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence, 50 
Harv. L. Rev. 557, 570 (1937); Stone, An Analysis of 
Hohfeld, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 313 (1963). 
33 E.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119 (1968) (Harlan, 
J., dissenting). 
